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Policy Brief

February 17, 2015

The Impracticality of Sanctions and Why Diplomacy Makes Sense in South Sudan

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Summary

This paper analyses whether sanctions can stop the war in South Sudan. Prior evidence shows that when sanctions in any forms are imposed, they do little in most cases to change the behaviors of the warring parties. Multilateral targeted sanctions, including arms embargo supported by the regional countries, may force the parties to listen. However, sanctions can be difficult to implement due to a wide range of geopolitical, economic and commercial interests that outweigh the benefits the parties may gain from issuing them. In authoritarian states, the lines between individual leaders and the state is very blurry, as leaders take any sanctions on them as a direct hostility to the state.

We argue that since sanctions are taken as weapons of last resort, they may thwart diplomatic efforts to bring peace to South Sudan. When the sanctions are imposed and peace is not achieved, diplomacy will certainly suffer and the parties imposing sanctions would lose any diplomatic leverage. We propose a continued use of high-level diplomatic engagement¹, instead of sanctions, to help stop the war in South Sudan. The paper suggests that the United States (US), with support from Norway, UK and neighboring states, could achieve this goal by appointing a high profile person to lead peace efforts in South Sudan.

Introduction

Recently, the international community has increasingly been talking about the possibility of imposing sanctions on South Sudanese warring parties for obstructing the peace process and violating the cessation of hostilities agreement signed in January 2014. The United States of America (USA) and the European Union (EU) have already slammed three generals, two on the government's side and one on the

¹ By high-level diplomatic engagement, we mean involvement of people and institutions of high profile such as US President, Secretary of State, US Congress, UN Secretary General, UN Security Council, UN General Assembly, AU and EU, among others, in objectively making efforts to end the war in South Sudan using soft power.

rebels' side, with similar sets of sanctions. However, calls² for more targeted sanctions³, including an arms embargo⁴, have continued to be echoed within the civil society and diplomatic communities⁵. The Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Eastern Africa regional body, which is mediating the South Sudanese peace process, along with the African Union (AU), have also joined in issuing threats⁶ for regional sanctions. Particularly, IGAD's threats came through its November 2014's resolution⁷, which called for asset freezes, travel bans, and forceful military intervention.

This policy brief addresses the central questions: could sanctions actually work to stop the war in South Sudan? What are the implications for sanctions? We argue that since sanctions are taken as weapons of last resort, they may end effective diplomatic efforts to bring peace to South Sudan. When sanctions are imposed and peace is not achieved, diplomacy certainly suffers, as the parties imposing sanctions may lose diplomatic leverage. Gleaning from the aforementioned US and EU's planned targeted sanctions, the warring parties have not flinched nor changed course after sanctioning the three army generals. Sanctioning these generals may be seen as a warning to the principals. However, sanctioning principals won't work because it antagonizes diplomatic efforts. Hence, instead of sanctions, we recommend an application of high-level diplomatic engagement, exemplified by 2014's visits of Ban Ki Moon and US Secretary of States, John Kerry. This is important because their visits resulted in the first face-to-face

²Open Letter to the UN Security Council on South Sudan. <http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/12/09/open-letter-un-security-council-south-sudan>

³Statement by USA's House Foreign Affairs Committee calling for more targeted sanctions on December 16, 2014: <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/press-release/chairman-royce-ranking-member-engel-statement-deteriorating-security-south-sudan-need>

⁴Rights groups urge United States to seek U.N. arms embargo on South Sudan <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/08/us-southsudan-arms-embargo-idUSKBN0KH1EU20150108>

⁵inside the White House Fight over the Slaughter in South Sudan by Foreign Policy Magazine which reports that there has been a raging debate inside Obama's White House in which many in Obama Administration and allies such as Britain and France believe arms embargo is important to end the war in South Sudan. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/26/exclusive-inside-the-white-house-fight-southsudan-obama-conflict-susanrice-unitednations/>

⁶Oluoch, Fred. Threat of sanctions checks South Sudan leaders. The East African. <http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Threat-of-sanctions-checks-South-Sudan-leaders-/-/2558/2547090/-/13oga67z/-/index.html>

⁷Resolutions of the 28th Extraordinary Summit of the IGAD Heads of State and Government, Addis Ababa, 7 November 2014, paragraph 4

meeting of the two principals, President Kiir and former Vice President Riek Machar, which resulted in the signing of the political framework agreement in May 2014. There would have been progress if Mr. Kerry and Mr. Ki moon had sustained such a high-level engagement instead of threats of sanctions. Threats of sanctions can be a last resort after a sustained high-level diplomatic engagement does not show results.

What are Sanctions?

Generally, sanctions are punitive measures against individuals or countries. Sanctions lie midway between diplomacy and the use of force (Biersteker, 2004). They are normally invoked when soft diplomacy fails to produce intended policy change from the state or individuals spoilers. Normally, the UN Security Council, under Chapter Seven of its charter and regional and trade blocks as well as individual member states impose sanctions to coerce a party or parties to change policy such as signing a peace agreement to end a war, constrain a party or parties from carrying out an act and/or signal to a party or parties to respect an international norm without involving the use of force⁸ (Biersteker, 2004). International norms, which the UN Security Council protects, include prohibition of war or armed conflict, gross human rights violations, counter-terrorism, non-constitutional change of governments, improved governance (e.g. natural resources & security sector), non-proliferation and protection of population under the responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine (Target Sanctions Consortium 2013). About 60% of the targeted sanctions applied by the UN have been on armed conflicts, 15% have been on counter terrorism, 10% have been on non-proliferation and 10% have been on support for democracy (ibid). These have been used as tools of a last resort in the event of diplomatic failures. It is hoped that once the sanctions are imposed, the affected party would submit to the demands of the international community or sanctions imposer. This has not been the case, however, in many examples around the world.

Sanctions fall under two broad categories, namely targeted sanctions and comprehensive sanctions. Targeted sanctions include (1) embargoes on arms, services sectors (e.g. aviation) and commodities (e.g. fuel, gold and diamond) and (2) individual sanctions (e.g. travel ban and asset freeze). Comprehensive sanctions cover a wide range of services, economic sectors, leaders, decision and policymakers, among others. See table 1 for details.

Table 1: Types of Targeted Sanctions (the degree of non-discrimination increases in descending order from individual/entity to comprehensive sanctions) (source: Target Sanctions Consortium 2013).

1. Individual/targeted entity (e.g. travel ban, assets freeze)

⁸Biersteker. T.J. 2004. The Emergence, Evolution, Effects, and Challenges of Targeted Sanctions Paper prepared for the conference Sanctions Economiques: Vers de Nouvelles Pratiques.

2. *Diplomatic sanctions (e.g. targeting one sector of government by expelling ambassadors and diplomats)*
 3. *Arms embargoes or proliferation related goods (targeting the fighting forces)*
 4. *Commodity sanctions on commodities other than oil (e.g. diamonds, timber, charcoal)*
 5. *Transportation sanctions (e.g. aviation, shipping ban)*
 6. *Core economic sanctions (e.g. oil and financial sector. They are the least discriminating target sanctions as they affect the wider population)*
 7. *Comprehensive sanctions (on everything or non-discriminating)*
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Comprehensive sanctions have largely been ineffective and have been blamed for indiscriminate consequences, intended or unintended particularly on innocent citizens. For the aforesaid reasons, the international community has largely moved away from such sanction regimes, except in a few cases.

Targeted sanctions, also known as smart sanctions⁹, emerge as an alternative to comprehensive sanctions that attempt to avoid the unintended negative consequences associated with the comprehensive sanctions (Biersteker, 2004). Targeted sanctions are imposed on sectors, leaders, decision and policymakers to avoid harm to innocent civilians (Brzosk, 2008; Gordon, 2010). Like comprehensive sanctions, targeted sanctions are also ineffective in most cases. Evidence from literature suggests that smart sanctions are wrought with issues pertaining to their effectiveness, so “options other than smart sanctions should be pursued¹⁰” (Drezner, 2011). In terms of the effectiveness of targeted sanctions applied by the UN Security Council, the objective of coercion was not achieved in 63% of the cases. Constraining and making a signal were a bit more effective than coercing as shown in table 2.

Table 2: Effectiveness of Sanctions (Source: Target Sanctions Consortium 2013)

	Effective	Mixed	Ineffective
Coerce	10%	27%	63%
Constrain	28%	22%	50%
Signal	27%	44%	29%

⁹Gordon, J. [‘Smart Sanctions’ on Iran are Dumb](#). Foreign Policy in Focus

¹⁰Drezner, D.W. 2011. Sanctions Sometimes Smart: Targeted Sanctions in Theory and Practice. *International Studies Review* (2011) 13, 96–108

On arms embargoes, there is a significant scholarly consensus that arms embargoes do not most of the time stop the flow of arms or change behaviors of targeted countries (Brzosk, 2008). Although evidence shows that arms embargoes can stop the transfer of weapons from one source to another, they cannot stop the flow of arms into the targeted country or party completely (ibid). The affected parties use alternative routes or third countries or black market contractors to circumvent the sanctions. In general, the impact¹¹ of arms embargoes is rather described as irrelevant or malevolent (Brzosk, 2008, Fruchart et al., 2007). Significantly, arms embargoes rarely 'change the political positions of civil war actors; instead they criminalize targeted societies, breed hatred and benefit arms suppliers willing to break the rules'¹² (Tierney 2005).

Just like the arms embargoes, individual sanctions, such as travel bans and asset freezes, also do not, most of the time, change the behavior of the targeted individuals. For example, targeted sanctions on leaders of ZANU–PF in Zimbabwe did not result in any significant political change. Like comprehensive sanctions, targeted sanctions also have unintended consequences on the society. Unintended consequences of targeted sanctions include ‘increases in corruption and criminality, strengthening of authoritarian rule, burdens on neighboring states, strengthening of political factions, resource diversion, and humanitarian impacts’ (Target Sanctions Consortium, 2013). Furthermore, the ineffectiveness of sanctions affects the credibility of the UN or any other authority issuing sanctions (ibid). Targeted Sanctions Consortium (2013), an international body of scholars and practitioners, in its 2013 study, found that all imposed targeted sanctions were associated with 69% increase in corruption and criminality. In the same study, it was found that there was 54% rise in authoritarian rule as well as 44% upturn in resources diversion. Targeted sanctions were also associated with 39% increase in negative humanitarian consequences as well as 39% upsurge in harm on the legitimacy and authority of the entity issuing sanctions.¹³

But sanctions can also be successful. One example of relative success stories of targeted sanctions is Libya. The UN targeted sanctions, which were aimed at coercing the Libyan state to renounce terrorism and provide compensation to families of terror victims, were effective. Libya complied, provided compensation for the victims, and released the suspects (Target Sanctions, 2013). However, the targeted sanctions strengthened Gaddafi’s authoritarian rule (ibid). Target sanctions increase authoritarian rule because

¹¹Fruchart, Damien, Paul Holtom, Simeon Wezeman, Daniel Strandow, and Peter

Wallenstein. (2007) United Nations Arms Embargoes. Stockholm: SIPRI.

¹²Tierney, D. 2005. Irrelevant or malevolent? UN arms embargoes in civil wars.

¹³Report of the Targeted Sanctions Consortium.2013. The Effectiveness of United Nations Targeted Sanctions.

the affected leaders rally their societies behind them and such a rally is geared towards confronting what is seen as an infringement on national sovereignty usually by foreign elements. In such a state, the society normally gives its leaders all the tools and power to confront foreign aggression and this usually includes having the leader infringed on civil liberties.

In contrast, President Bashir of Sudan has defied the ICC's arrest warrant and has continued to run Sudan without being held accountable for the crimes he has been accused of. The same is true for Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, who defied travel bans and economic sanctions and recently for Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto of Kenya, who got elected after their indictment by the ICC¹⁴. The leader of the infamous Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) Joseph Kony¹⁵, an indicted warlord, is still at large and continues to abduct and terrorize citizens in a number of countries several years after his indictment by the ICC. In other words, his indictment did not change the atrocious tendencies of the LRA and its leader. Some argue that his indictment increased international pressure and resulted in reduction of LRA's insurgency. However, this achievement could be partly attributed to joint efforts from different countries, including South Sudan.

Evidence abounds in the literature showing that targeted sanctions do not work most of the time because they are easily evaded (Target Sanctions Consortium 2013). Of all targeted sanctions that the UN had imposed, 90% of the cases used black market contractors (by charging a service fee to deliver services for the targeted parties), safe havens, disguised identity or forged documents, used informal value transfer systems, front companies, disguised vessels, relied on family members, diverted trade through third countries, stockpiled supplies especially if sanctions had been threatened in advance, diversified sources of revenues or investment particularly if an economic sector had been targeted, used import substitution and coerced or pressured major trading partners not to enforce sanctions (ibid). For example, Sudan got an arms embargo from EU in 1994 but it was able to acquire arms from China and other allies during the

¹⁴ Election of Kenyatta and Ruto is an example of how targeted leaders can use such an international target to gain sympathy from the public.

¹⁵ The most important lesson to be learned from Kony's case is that his ICC's indictment marked the end of the peace process in Northern Uganda. Even though Kony has little presence in Northern Uganda as we write, he is still a threat to the regional security. An internationally supported efforts that give peace a chance over justice would have removed Kony from the bush and stopped him from continued threats to regional peace and security. The same is true for South Sudan. An internationally supported high level diplomatic efforts will be more effective in ending the war in South Sudan than sanctions.

north-south civil war. Sudan also sold its assets identified in the US sanctions and imposed restrictions on foreign currency¹⁶.

Sanctions in South Sudan's Context

Having discussed at length what sanctions are and the circumstances under which they can be effective, could targeted or comprehensive sanctions work in South Sudan? South Sudan is currently covered by EU's arms embargo imposed in July 2011 immediately after the country became independent. This arms embargo dates back to 1994 when the EU imposed it on Sudan in an attempt to stop the north-south civil war and was amended to cover the independent South Sudan by prohibiting weapons, ammunition, military vehicles, spare parts and equipment, brokering services, military financial and technical assistance¹⁷¹⁸. Only supplies for non-lethal military equipment for humanitarian purposes and support for security sector reform are exempted from the 2011 EU's arms embargo on South Sudan (ibid).

As mentioned early, the Obama Administration issued an executive order last year that allowed targeted sanctions to be imposed on individuals on both sides of the South Sudanese conflict. The EU did the same. So far, these targeted sanctions have not yielded any fruits; instead they seem to have emboldened the affected individuals as violence has continued since the individuals were sanctioned. The EU's arm embargo has not been able to stop South Sudan's internal conflict such as the current civil war, and a number of rebellions that predated it, including David Yau and George Athor's revolts.

In 1997, the US imposed trade sanctions and blockage of property and interests on Sudan for its "support for international terrorism, efforts to destabilize neighboring governments, and involvement in pervasive human rights violations." Such sanctions were not concretely aimed at ending the war in the South, even though associating human rights violations with the war was part of it. Reports show that Sudan cooperated to a certain extent on issues of terrorism.

However, the chance to end North-South war came with the coming of President Bush to power in 2001. Even though threats of sanctions and promise to lift Sudan from the list of terror sponsors were applied, what contributed greatly to ending the north-south

¹⁶Effectiveness of US Economic Sanctions with respect to Sudan.

¹⁷Council Decision 2011 /423/CFSP of 18 July 2011 concerning restrictive measures against Sudan and South Sudan and repealing Common Position 2005/411/CFSP. http://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/eu_arms_embargoes/south_sudan/council-decision-2011-423-cfsp.pdf

¹⁸ Also see http://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/eu_arms_embargoes/south_sudan

civil war in the Sudan is high-level diplomatic influence by the Bush administration. The basis of attributing the end of North – South war to Bush’s high-level diplomatic engagement is that sanctions and arms embargo existed before Bush came up with an approach of giving the issue a high profile attention it deserved and it worked. Bush’s high-level diplomatic engagement was in the form of a high profile Senator, John Danforth and personal involvement of Secretary of State Colin Powell, who did not only engage both parties, but also participated in the talks, eventually breaking a number of impasses with concrete workable proposals. President Bush himself took the issue with compassion, commitment and made it a priority of his government¹⁹. Such high-level engagement was highly exemplified through the convening of a special sitting of the UN Security Council on the North-South civil war in Nairobi in 2003. Another important landmark support to the peace process was the Sudan Peace Act of 2002²⁰. By the time this Act was enacted, the parties, through the help of Senator Danforth and IGAD mediator General Lazarus Sumbeiywo, had signed in July 2002 the Protocol on the Universal Right to Self-Determination for the Southern Sudanese.

The threats of sanctions being considered now are not based on evidence that the parties have actually refused to bring peace. What is not there is a concrete engagement of the international actors at a level that is worthy of the magnitude of the crisis. The engagement level has been timid, antagonistic and bordering bullying. This type of diplomacy will not produce desirable results. The level of diplomacy that is desired is one that engages both parties with concrete proposals to bridge the differences and not the type that attempts to bully or coerce the parties.

¹⁹President Bush’s remarks (exhibiting his commitment and passion to end the war) announcing the appointment of Senator John Danforth as Special Envoy for Peace to Sudan in September 2001: “today, the tragedy in Sudan commands the attention and compassion of the world. For our part, we’re committed to pursuing a just peace, which will spare that land from more years of sorrow. We’re committed to bringing stability to the Sudan, so that many loving Americans, non-governmental organizations, will be able to perform their duties of love and compassion within that country without fear of reprisal. Recently, I appointed a humanitarian envoy, Andrew Natsios, the administrator of USAID, to address the material needs. Today I take a step further by naming a distinguished American, a former United States Senator and ordained minister, a man of enormous respect, the United States will continue to signal to the rest of the world our interest in this subject, our desire to bring governments together to achieve a lasting peace. I will repeat what I told Jack in the Oval Office: our administration is deeply committed - - is deeply committed -- to bringing good folks together, from within our country and the leadership of other nations, to get this issue solved once and for all. It’s a test of the compassion of the world.” Extracted from <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010906-3.html>.

²⁰ Sudan Peace Act 2002: <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/19897.pdf>

South Sudan possesses the characteristics of countries where sanctions may not work (both targeted and comprehensive). These characteristics include lack of strong opposition and democratic culture, lack of effective multilateral support for sanctions and having a fragile economy (Oudraat 2007). On lack of democratic culture and strong opposition, if sanctions are imposed, they “may be counterproductive as ruling elites may depict their domestic opponents as traitors, and thus amplify existing jingoistic attitudes” (ibid).

Sanctions could work if they have multilateral support— meaning all the major stakeholder countries must be on board to support and implement sanctions. This approach worked in the case of Apartheid South Africa, because it was isolated internationally. However, it is nearly impossible to get a multilateral sanctions regime on South Sudan, as neighbors’ economic and commercial interests appear to outweigh the benefits they will get in imposing the sanctions. They can only do this if they decide without analyzing the economic and commercial repercussions. They can also support sanctions only if they know targeted leaders are not going to be in power.

Neighbors are certainly going to be divided over this issue and countries that have direct economic and commercial links with South Sudan are likely to oppose the move. If Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia and Sudan were to impose sanctions on South Sudan, it would certainly get the parties to listen, practically; however, they can oppose the move because of fear of desperate reactions from South Sudan in issuing protectionist measures in many areas of commercial and economic interests. Some people argue that this won’t happen if leaders are targeted; however, there is a thin line between individual leaders and the state they are running, particularly if a state has little democratic culture as mentioned early. So for these individuals, any sanctions on them are like sanctions on the state. Therefore, they can use the state powers to fight back. Besides, it would set precedence in a region that is mired in localized conflicts such as the threats of Alshabab in Somalia, the never-ending conflicts in the Sudan and intermittent subversive rebel activities in Ethiopia.

As a highlight to the significance of economic investment of neighboring countries, South Sudan has been number one destination for Uganda’s exports (African Development Bank, 2013). Sudan has financial interests in South Sudan; it gets significant portion of its revenues from South Sudan’s oil exports. This is on top of revenues from exports of food and manufactured goods. So openly supporting and imposing sanctions will not be in Sudan’s best economic and commercial interests. In addition, a sanction coming from Sudan would be seen by South Sudan as a direct rejuvenation of historical hostilities. Kenya and Ethiopia have huge investment interests in banking, fuel imports and hospitality sectors in South Sudan. Any sanctions will affect such commercial and investment interests.

Apart from the four neighbors, China and Malaysia come in as the most influential powers in terms of investment and commercial interests, particularly in the oil and gas sectors. Like the four neighbors of South Sudan, these countries will less likely collaborate in implementing any sanctions. Fearing the possibility of the UN Security Council taking the proposal to impose sanctions, South Sudan government has been courting both Russia and China in the hope that they can veto any such proposition.

The Troika countries: USA, UK and Norway are also very significant in terms of being the major sources of humanitarian and development assistance and having historical ties with South Sudan going back several decades during the civil war. This relationship gives Troika enviable leverage over the warring parties, a resource the group is underutilizing in this crisis. We are convinced that if this leverage was used to engage the parties constructively, it could help reach an implementable agreement. However, if the Troika resorts to sanctions before exhausting diplomatic efforts, such a move will harden the positions of the parties and the group would have expended their leverage unwisely.

The Troika should engage the parties with practical proposals and diplomatically nudge them into making necessary concessions. For example, the parties have already agreed on a government of National Unity, with what remains contentious being power sharing. This is where Troika could make a meaningful contribution. Which party should concede what is where we are at the moment and the parties need to move closer to an agreement. The security arrangement is the other issue that will need to be addressed and the Troika could also present workable proposals and nudge the parties towards making concessions. Difficult and complex problems need time and the parties should be pushed, but also given a space to dialogue and work out acceptable scenarios.

South Sudan falls under the category of countries not suitable for sanctions due to troubled or fragile economy (Oudraat 2007). Developing or fragile economies are not good candidates for sanctions “because sanctions aggravate existing problems and can result in humanitarian crises” (Ibid). The economic situation in South Sudan is terribly worrying and so sanctions, especially those that would affect any economic sector would drive the state towards collapse, a situation that should be avoided at all cost. This situation should be considered seriously because the declining oil output and the plummeting global crude prices have made it very difficult for the government to generate enough revenue. Declines in oil revenues mean that hard currency reserves shrink by a large percentage, increasing inflation. This has led to increases in basic consumer goods’ prices, putting them out of reach of the majority of South Sudanese.

While embargoes limit the supply of weapons and ammunitions to the warring parties, who may be engaged in atrocities against civilians, it is not difficult to point out the fact that such measures can easily be circumvented. South Sudan itself is already replete with arms, particularly the small arms. Sudan and South Sudan’s borders are not demarcated

and evidence from Ethio-Eritrean border war suggests that these countries are technically at war and anything that dramatically changes the balance of power in favor of one country over the other, spells disaster.

Conclusion and Recommendations

We have argued that sanctions will ruin effective diplomatic efforts to bring peace to South Sudan. Literature shows sanctions are not effective most of the time and South Sudan fits into this context. So since the parties won't necessarily change their positions after being hit with sanctions but will instead feel antagonized, the imposing parties would lose any diplomatic leverage. We believe that there is still a lot of room for high-level diplomacy to end the war and therefore recommend the following instead of sanctions.

1. The Troika countries should come to the realization that their frustration with the slow pace of the peace process and with parties that are seemingly intransigent is in the way of objective and high-level diplomatic engagement.
2. The United States in particular should make recognizable and visible efforts to engage the parties and exert a much-needed soft power using its leverage over both parties. The US should appoint a high profile person respected by both sides of the South Sudanese conflict. Personalities such as former President George W. Bush and Colin Powell should be considered as possible role players.
3. The Troika countries and China should cooperate and engage the parties meaningfully and objectively with practical proposals to overcome any expected impasses in the process.
4. The IGAD Heads of State and Governments should give a reasonable space to the mediators to engage the parties as they try to end the conflict. They should limit unnecessary interference with the mediation efforts.
5. The Troika, IGAD leaders, and the mediators should identify areas where reasonable concessions would need to be made on both sides and push the parties to make all the necessary, reasonable compromises in order to bring peace.
6. The parties should willfully negotiate in good faith and recognize the urgency to sign a meaningful and workable peace agreement and to bring an end to the untold suffering of their people. This cannot happen when there are no concessions. Both the government and the rebels should make necessary concessions that produce a win-win situation for both parties and the people of South Sudan.
7. The international community should support faith-based groups to engage in an informal or a parallel dialogue and reconciliation process between principals, the military commanders, communities and other affected parties to soften the hardened positions and reduce bitter feelings. Prominent South Sudanese

elders/statesmen respected by both sides could also be tapped to engage the principals and communities.

8. The Intra-SPLM Agreement should be encouraged to act as a blueprint geared towards achieving sustainable peace through the IGAD led peace process.
9. The international community should support an IGAD led peace agreement that is centered on:
 - Complete security sector transformation—disciplined, professional, well equipped security forces with true national outlook loyal to the nation of South Sudan;
 - People based constitutional making process;
 - Transparent, accountable and equitable management of natural resources;
 - Public goods (e.g. clear and achievable targets on roads, electricity, sanitation, water, education, health, environment, economic opportunities for the youth and agriculture development);
 - Truth and reconciliation;
 - Democratic transformation, good governance and the rule of law.

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About Sudd Institute

The Sudd Institute is an independent research organization that conducts and facilitates policy relevant research and training to inform public policy and practice, to create opportunities for discussion and debate, and to improve analytical capacity in South Sudan. The Sudd Institute's intention is to significantly improve the quality, impact, and accountability of local, national, and international policy- and decision-making in South Sudan in order to promote a more peaceful, just and prosperous society.

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