National Dialogue: A Policy Framework

Francis Mading Deng

Summary

This policy paper frames the National Dialogue around a number of critical issues that provide a clear conceptual framework that is both comprehensive and simple enough to be easily understood by the public. The themes of the paper are outlined in a series of introductory questions.

The logic of these questions is to relate the current crises in the country to the unfulfilled dreams of the liberation struggle that should have provided guidance to the leadership in developing an appropriate system of governance for South Sudan. Such a system should not only have corrected the wrongs of the Old Sudan against which our people rebelled, but should have also provided the inspiration and guidelines for pursuing a more idealistic system that should have been a model to be admired and emulated by other countries. Instead, South Sudan is now widely perceived as a failed state whose crises are seen as threatening the peace of security of the region and endangering the wider international order.

The questions to be addressed must credibly investigate the sources of the crises: What went wrong? Why did we fail to realize the dreams of our long struggle for which our people sacrificed so much for so long? What obstacles stood in the way of pursuing and fulfilling those dreams? What can now be done to overcome those obstacles? What vision for our nation can we reconstruct and pursue in earnest? What role has the international community played both positively and negatively to influence developments and peace-building in our country? And what can we now do to regain and promote cooperation with the international community which has been negatively affected by our current crises? These are only some of the questions that we need to pose and address.
We must take the National Dialogue as an opportunity for diagnosing our ills, pose these questions candidly, and seek answers with an open mind and with a determination to respond credibly to the challenge of building a better future for our country. All those in positions of responsibility must commit to implementing the recommendations of the National Dialogue for a major reform and transformation of the system in the collective interest of the nation and a better life for future generations. The following policy suggestions are presented.

- Engage the Leadership of the SPLM/A in a sincere review of the ideals and principles of the liberation struggle and why the independent South Sudan has failed to honor the fundamental values of the struggle;

- Identify the challenges and obstacles that now stand in the way of radically reforming the system to revive the ideals and principles of the liberation struggle and how they can be acted upon to inspire and guide corrective measures to improve future performance;

- Undertake an objective and credible review of the history of the support South Sudan received from the international community in its liberation struggle and in its post-independence development efforts, why the country has lost international goodwill, and what can be done to regain it and promote international partnership in addressing the challenges facing South Sudan; and

- Develop and sustain a culture of Dialogue as a strategy for preventing, managing, and resolving internal conflicts and for constructively engaging the international community in a mutually beneficial partnership to address the security and development challenges facing the country.

1. Overview of the Challenge

As stipulated by the President of the Republic, Salva Kiir Mayardit, the key objective of the National Dialogue that he first announced on December 14, 2016 and officially launched on May 22, 2017, is the pursuit of peace and national unity. This implies bringing an end to the proliferating conflicts that are devastating our country. Ending violence and consolidating peace and unity in turn require addressing the root causes of the conflicts. These sets of objectives pose a number of critical questions that need to be urgently addressed.

First, what are the overriding principles of the South Sudanese liberation struggle that should guide our national deliberations on the crises tearing our country apart? Second, what factors in the turbulent peace process that ended the North-South war and post war legacies account for some of the crises that are afflicting the country? Third, as these guiding principles were a source of inspiration and aspirations in the struggle of the South Sudanese for decades, what prevented their realization after independence? Fourth, what now needs to be done to correct the situation and renew the pursuit of these erstwhile objectives and founding principles? Fifth, what are the predictable obstacles to achieving these objectives and fundamental principles? Sixth, what should be done to overcome these predictable obstacles? Seven, how can South Sudanese diplomacy contribute to effectively reactivating and vigorously mobilizing international partnerships in support of national endeavors?
In this paper, I elaborate on these questions and try to offer answers that might help provide a basis for addressing the issues tabled for the National Dialogue. I conclude with a summary of the issues and their implications for policy making and pertinent action.

2. Principles of the Struggle

It should be remembered that South Sudanese struggled for over half a century in pursuit of overriding objectives and principles. Among these were freedom from domination, recognition for their distinctive racial, cultural and religious identity, inclusivity and full equality in the governance of their country, and enjoyment of all the rights due to them as citizens without discrimination on any ground.

Associated with these overriding goals and objectives are the related principles of democratic participation in their government, respect for their political and civil rights and fundamental liberties, and the enjoyment of all the rights inherent in universal human dignity. With the guarantee of these basic rights, South Sudanese confidently expected to exploit their vast natural resources to promote the socio-economic development and prosperity which they had been denied by both colonial and post-colonial governments of the Sudan.

The liberation struggle of South Sudan took two phases. The first war, which lasted from 1955 to 1972, under the leadership of South Sudan Liberation Movement and its military wing, the Anyanya, was essentially a secessionist movement, but compromised in 1972 for regional autonomy. The unilateral abrogation of that agreement triggered the second war, 1983-2005, under the leadership of Sudan People's Liberation Movement and Army, SPLM/A, whose declared objective was no longer the independence of Southern Sudan, but the liberation of the whole country.

Whether for pragmatic or idealistic reasons, the cause of South Sudan had become entangled in the SPLM/A Vision of a New Sudan of full equality for all the peoples of the Sudan, South and North, without discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnicity, religion, culture or gender.

Apart from the Ngok Dinka of Abyei, who were annexed to the North by the British in 1905, but whom everybody recognizes as South Sudanese and had in any case been always an integral part of the Southern Sudanese struggle, the vision of the New Sudan had inspired the non-Arab groups in the Northern Sudanese states of Southern Kordofan (the Nuba) and Blue Nile (the Angasana or Funj), to join the South Sudanese in the struggle. The Darfurians to the West staged their own armed struggle. The Beja to the East and even the Nubians of the far North remained uneasy, although they did not join the armed struggle.

While the people of South Sudan ostensibly accepted the vision of the SPLM/A as a tactical means of counter-acting African and international resistance to secession, the
fighting men were popularly known to say, "We know what we are fighting for", which essentially meant independence.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement, CPA, that ended the war in 2005, gave the people of South Sudan the right to decide by a referendum to be exercised after a six-year interim period whether to remain in a United Sudan or become independent. South Sudanese decided overwhelmingly in favor of independence, which was formally declared on 9 July, 2011.

The Abyei Protocol of the CPA gave the Ngok Dinka of Abyei the right to decide through a referendum whether to remain in North Sudan or rejoin the South, but Khartoum blocked the exercise of that right. The CPA also gave the people of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states the right to decide through a vague concept of popular consultation how they were to be governed within a United Sudan. The Darfurians were not included in the peace agreement and were pursuing their own armed struggle. Although the Beja and the Nubians remained dormant, they were no longer comfortable within the normative framework of the Old Sudan.

Independence came as a joyous surprise for the South Sudanese, as they had prepared themselves for a prolonged struggle in pursuit of the vision of a New Sudan and for the full and unqualified freedom from domination by the North. Nevertheless, they expected to at last enjoy all the rights and freedoms for which they had fought so hard for so long.

The independent South Sudan was expected to build a nation that would correct the ills of the Old Sudan and become a model that would live up to the ideals for which its people had fought. To safeguard this new nation, three areas of reform were high in the order of priority. The first was to reorganize and modernize the SPLA to be a national army, well trained and equipped to be an effective force to defend the independence, integrity and sovereignty of the new country. The second was to reorganize the SPLM to be a national political party capable of running a democratic modern nation state. The third was to establish a government that would guarantee the peace and security of the country, protect all its citizens without discrimination, provide peace dividends, and generate a robust equitable program of socio-economic development that would effectively exploit the vast natural resources of the country and promote the prosperity of its people, which had been frustrated by decades of warfare. In other words, South Sudan was to be the realization of dreams and ideals to which the people had aspired for decades.

Reality would however set in to create a contrastingly disappointing picture. Perhaps the most obvious contradiction which should have been foreseen but was surprisingly overlooked was that South Sudan would remain connected to the Sudan through the unresolved conflicts in the North that had become an integral part of the Southern struggle. While most South Sudanese did not seem to worry about the plight of fellow Northern Sudanese who had been comrades in arms, but were now left in the Old Sudan against which they had fought together with the South, the leadership of the SPLM/A did not forget them. Indeed, President Salva Kiir Mayardit stated in his independence speech that they would not abandon them, but would instead support their cause through peace-
ful means. That peaceful means would prove to be a coded language for what Sudan and the international community would continue to see as unwarranted support for the rebels of the Sudan and an interference in the internal affairs of the Sudan. Sudan would retaliate by continuing to support old and new rebels against the leadership in South Sudan. In other words, the two countries would remain bound by conflict.

3. Turbulent Road to Independence

To be sure, many people around the world had opposed the independence of South Sudan with doomsday predictions. Sudan, supported by many inside and outside Africa, argued that South Sudanese were acutely divided by tribalism, that the only thing that united them was their common opposition to the North, that without that uniting factor and the control of the central government from the North, the country would be torn apart by inter-tribal conflicts. An independent South Sudan was destined to be a failed state, or worse, would collapse. The crises of an independent South Sudan would destabilize the entire region and endanger international peace and security.

Furthermore, Sudan argued that the independence of South Sudan would set a bad example for the whole of Africa, where racial, ethnic, tribal and other sources of diversity posed a pervasive threat to national unity in virtually all the countries. This was indeed a concern that was shared by many in Africa and internationally.

Questions should have been asked as to what would cause an independent South Sudan to fail or collapse, whether the reasons would be internal or external, and what, if any, could be done to prevent that predicted outcome. But these questions were never posed. Instead, the Southern Sudanese leadership emphatically asserted that their country would not fail or collapse. How so was also not explained. For South Sudanese, their path to independence was a preordained destiny which no doomsday predictions could block.

The sub-regional countries of the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development, IGAD, who first initiated the peace process in the early 1990s, stipulated in their Declaration of Principles, DoPs, a more nuanced approach than the blanket opposition to secession which the Sudan advocated. They stated quite emphatically that the people of South Sudan were entitled to the right of self-determination, including independence, which they had never exercised, that the unity of the Sudan should be given priority, but that the Government of the Sudan must create the necessary conditions for unity, stipulated to include separation of state and religion. Failing that, the right of the people of South Sudan to secede must be accepted.

Although the Government of the Sudan indicated from the start that it was not prepared to compromise on its Islamization agenda, including the application of Sharia to the whole country, the issue of self-determination for the South remained quite controversial until the very end, both in Africa and internationally.

The leadership of a few countries and some key individuals was pivotal to the eventual change of positions on the issue, among them the Troika of Norway, United Kingdom,
and the United States, and specifically President Barack Obama of the United States, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, and leaders from the sub-region.

It is obvious from this brief overview of the peace process that there were misgivings about the independence of South Sudan that would continue to haunt the country and that needed to be addressed for South Sudan to be truly secure in its independence.

4. Independence with Strings

As South Sudanese joyously celebrated their independence in a blazing African sun, it should have been obvious that while the independence of the South was a monumental achievement, there were some elements of unfinished business. The referendum of Abyei had been blocked by Khartoum and despite the promise of support declared by President Salva Kiir Mayardit, the Nuba and the Angassana were still under the yoke of Khartoum. Furthermore, the South Sudanese militias whom Khartoum had recruited, trained, armed, and unleashed against the South, remained under the command of Khartoum's loyal allies.

The SPLM/A had lost its founding leader, Dr. John Garang de Mabior, only two weeks into the implementation of the CPA. His successor was about to inherit an independent South Sudan that had been utterly destroyed by half a century of war. Dr. John Garang had declared two principles that he said would guide his government: taking towns to the people in the rural areas, and investing oil revenues in agriculture as an engine of economic growth. He was also reported to have responded to a question about his priorities for development by repeating: 'roads, roads, roads', three times. These declared policies are now often mentioned only as relics of unfulfilled dreams.

As President Salva Kiir Mayardit embarked on the leadership of a country that had been acutely divided by a long devastating and fragmenting war, he correctly made the unity of the country his top priority. Toward that end, he began to absorb the armed militias. This was highly applauded, but it was to prove paradoxically a source of ongoing disunity and chronic violence as ambitious commanders saw rebellion as a rewarding adventure.

The unresolved issues between Sudan and South Sudan, in particular the mutual allegation that they were continuing to support each other's rebels, means that the two countries remained entangled in conflict. Unless they cooperated in resolving each other's internal conflicts, their bilateral relations would continue to be confrontational. Conversely, cooperating on ending their internal conflicts would contribute to normalizing their bilateral relations and fostering cooperation between them. That dilemma continues to haunt the relations between the two countries.

5. Obstacles to Nationhood

The rampant violence, disunity, and crisis of nationhood that continue to afflict the country can be said to be both internally based and externally connected, if not generated. It must be remembered that South Sudan became independent as a country in ruin, phys-
cally, socially, culturally, economically and environmentally. It was a country in which the overwhelming portion of the population knew nothing but war. The vast majority of the adult population of South Sudan grew up from childhood to middle age, and on to becoming elders, with nothing but the pride of their struggle for freedom and dignity. The overwhelming majority of the people for whom they fought had also been impoverished by war and the deprivations of state mismanagement.

So, when freedom came, with dividends accruing only to the leadership, embellished by the unexpectedly abundant oil revenues, the impulse to make up for lost opportunities became apparently irresistible.

Corruption has largely been attributed to greed, but it is also fueled by need. When a senior government official or military officer is seen by his impoverished people as a potential benefactor in providing for their essential needs, and he has access to public resources, temptation can become difficult to resist. The line between wrong and right becomes quite thin. Not very many people have the moral fortitude to resist crossing that thin line.

How else can the magnitude of the corruption that squandered billions of US dollars of public funds, with nothing to show for them, be explained? And how can such a magnitude of corruption be criminally or financially accounted for or remedied?

The predicaments of South Sudan are however far more serious than material; the social fabric of the country, including its cultural values and institutions, has been destroyed, not only by external domination over many decades, but ironically also by the war of liberation. Warlords not only enriched themselves, but usurped the role of traditional leadership. In some cases, they humiliated and even dismissed legitimate traditional leaders and replaced them with their own puppets.

Traditionally, Chiefs and elders were the peacemakers who controlled the youth warrior age sets. In modern terms, this meant civilian control of the military. In the militarized society of today, elders become the warriors in the positions of generals and commanders, instead of the peacemakers they traditionally were. The traditional age set system, which not only regimented males and females into defined roles throughout life, but also mobilized youth to perform public functions that required physical strength beyond warfare, have for all intents and purposes, disappeared. The war ethics that strictly prevented children and women from being targeted or harmed in any way are no longer respected. The practice of child soldiers has become the norm. Rape, which traditionally condemned and ostracized the culprit to the point of being banished from the society and forced into exile, has become a weapon of war. Civilians, including women, children and the elderly, are now the primary victims of warfare.

A major problem of African constitutionalism and system of governance is that they are not based on indigenous cultural values and institutions. During the European colonial rule, the governance system that prevailed was one of authoritarianism, dictatorship, centralized control and domination. At independence, the colonial rulers reversed themselves and bequeathed their European models of constitutionalism with their ideals that they did
not adhere to during their rule. Their concepts and institutions of democracy, human rights, civil liberties, and fundamental freedoms were foreign organs transplanted in the African body politics. No wonder they were soon rejected, overthrown, and discarded without tears being shed.

In the context of South Sudan, the anthropologically well documented segmentary lineage system, which ensured autonomous self-government for groups down to the family, has been replaced by a centralized system of governance. The colonial use of the traditional leaders through indirect rule, which was an effective economical means of maintaining law and order, has been severely weakened. The traditional justice system, which rested on persuasion and consensus building, is now replaced by coercion, guaranteed by police and even military force. While the security agents perform an important public service, some of them engage in excessive practices that threaten the freedoms and civil liberties of ordinary citizens. This is in sharp contrast with what anthropologists have described as the statelessness or ordered anarchy of our indigenous societies, where discipline and security prevailed without military or police force.

Socio-economically, instead of traditional self-reliance in the construction of homes, agricultural production, and animal husbandry that reinforced independence and self-sufficiency in our indigenous societies, the control of resources, employment opportunities, and projects for socio-economic development are now virtually the monopoly of central government. This makes the stakes in the central government and the correlated struggle for power very high. Being in Government provides access to public goods; being out of power means deprivation and impoverishment. No wonder, many strive to have their hands in the pie. The outcome of all this is that the ordinary people of South Sudan are being systematically disempowered and impoverished.

South Sudanese need to look at themselves to see the state of their country and ask some tough questions about what went wrong and how it can be remedied with a sense of urgency.

6. Internal Way Forward

The solution to a problem begins with understanding the origins and causes of the problem. The foregoing description and analysis of the situation in South Sudan indicates that the crises in the country must be traced to the long struggle of the people, its impact on the country as a whole, and the persistent legacy of the decades long war with the North.

The first step in the way forward is to recall the objectives of the struggle which have been derailed and compromised by the intervening exigencies that have occupied the leadership since independence.

Foremost of the principles the people of South Sudan struggled for was freedom from domination and the enjoyment of political, social and cultural rights. This requires creating a conducive climate of peace and security. Such a climate can only be created and
consolidated through policies of inclusivity and equality for all groups without discrimination or distinction. This calls for constructive management of diversity.

Diversity itself is a relative concept which exists in all countries and societies and at all levels, from global to local, down to individuals. Even Somalia, one of the most homogeneous countries in the world, whose people are united by ethnicity, religion, language and culture, has been torn apart by clan differences.

What causes conflict is not the mere differences, but the implications of those differences in the shaping of power, sharing of wealth, and overall position in society. In countries marked by racial, ethnic, religious and cultural diversities, some people are considered members of an in-group who enjoy the full rights of belonging, while others are marginalized, discriminated, and excluded as members of an out-group.

In the Old Sudan, the division was clear-cut between the privileged ruling Arab-Islamic minority and the non-Arab, non-Muslim groups, who were marginalized, discriminated against, and excluded from the full enjoyment of citizenship rights. The vision of the New Sudan was in essence aimed at correcting this gross inequality/inequity. In South Sudan, such stark differences and discrimination do not exist, since all South Sudanese recognize themselves as racially and culturally African, and accept their religious differences on equal footing. But South Sudan is composed of some 64 ethnic groups, which, given the relativity of diversity, is not an insignificant source of potential tensions and conflict, rooted in real or perceived inequality in the shaping and sharing of values.

Although the tensions and conflicts that have afflicted the SPLM/A since its inception have primarily been due to ideological and political differences, they have also been linked to ethnic divisions. The 1991 abortive coup of Riek Machar and Lam Akol started as an ideological and political difference with their leader, John Garang, but soon became an almost genocidal Dinka-Nuer conflict. The 2013 violence first erupted as a power struggle within the SPLM/A between Riek Machar and President Salva Kiir Mayardit, but soon developed into an ethnic conflict that is seen as primarily pitting the Nuer against the Dinka. Since then, many groups, generally identified on ethnic bases, have joined the opposition against the government which is increasingly perceived as Dinka dominated.

In this polarized and polarizing conflict, perceptions can overshadow reality, and whatever the equations of the power structures, the Dinka are being seen as having replaced the Arabs as the rulers in an ethnically unjust system. As the various ethnic groups converge against what they perceive as Dinka domination, the Dinka in turn begin to perceive themselves as targeted and paradoxically as in imminent danger of a genocidal onslaught. They therefore strive to mobilize themselves in self-defense. The ethnic confrontation that Khartoum had warned the international community against has tragically become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

In this context of perceived ethnic polarization and stratification, the quest for a New Sudan is no longer a relic of the past, but a call for a reform agenda that has become in-
creasingly pertinent to South Sudan. Since the overriding goal of full equality and non-discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnicity, religion or culture cannot be disputed, people should be united behind it as a desired objective. Any unjustified allegations of inequality can then be empirically questioned, objectively tested, and verified by the facts on the ground.

As President Salva Kiir Mayardit has stated in his Concept Note and various statements on the National Dialogue, echoed by the opening statements of the Co-Chairs of the Steering Committee, the Dialogue must be based on inclusivity, integrity, and transparency. By the same token, achieving and sustaining peace in South Sudan must be both a top down and a bottom up strategy.

The need for negotiating and resolving the conflict between and among the various warring parties is well recognized as a challenge at the national level. Equally pressing are the conflicts at the regional level which pit communities against one another. And at the grassroots level, there are conflicts which are essentially intra-communal, but must also be of concern to the nation as a whole.

What is often overlooked is the importance of the traditional authorities to the maintenance of peace and security at the grassroots. As noted earlier, it is these authorities who managed through the indirect rule policy to supplement the meager human and material resources of British colonial administration to establish and maintain peace and security throughout the vast country of one million square miles. As also already noted, the role of traditional leaders has been eroded, weakened, and grossly undermined by the post-independence developments in the Sudan, including the North-South civil war. These traditional institutions and related cultural values must now be restored, strengthened and reformed to play an effective role in the modern South Sudanese context.

7. International Outreach

The paradox of the South Sudanese crisis is that it has eroded the enormous goodwill which the international community demonstrated toward the new country at independence. South Sudan is now quite isolated from the international community and even former friends and allies are turning into adversaries. What is ironic about this turn of events is that these former friends and allies, who are now critical of South Sudan, are driven by concern over the plight of our people, whom they see as victims of power-thirsty leaders who seem to care less about their own people. What is particularly painful is the perception that the international community cares more about the people of South Sudan than do their own leaders.

In this international condemnation, those countries who supported the independence of South Sudan are now being blamed by those who were opposed to Southern Sudanese independence who see them as responsible for the post-independence crisis in the country. The attitude of these critics appears to be, "We told you so". Particularly ironic is that by supporting South Sudan against international scrutiny, these countries are now posing as our friends and we applaud them in appreciation.
What this situation calls for is a serious reassessment of South Sudan's diplomacy to broaden our global outreach and increase our partners without losing old friends. In this respect, it is important to bear in mind that foreign policy is an extension of domestic policy and that winning support internationally is not so much a function of being well spoken or clever, but of having a credible and winning message to convey. Putting one's house in order is a critical first step to reaching out externally.

It is also important to cultivate a common ground of cooperation on the basis of shared interests and concerns. In this connection, it is worth remembering that our former friends and allies, who are now among our most vocal critics, are motivated by their concern about the plight of our country and our people, whose independence they had supported against many opponents. In a sense, they feel that we have failed them. Their concern should also be our concern. This should provide a common ground for cooperation rather than confrontation. Instead of being defensive, in denial, or angry against their allegations, we should appreciate their concern as primarily in our national interest and therefore providing a basis for working together to bring a speedy end to our crises. Where they are factually wrong in their allegations against us, we should engage them and correct them objectively and constructively instead of antagonizing them. While we welcome new friends and should work to win more, we must strive to restore and maintain our old friends instead of turning them into foes.

Our overriding goal must be to develop a positive domestic agenda which we can proudly promote as a basis for winning friendships and partnerships internationally. Defensiveness and denials only generate cynicism, more accusations and greater condemnation. Ultimately, cooperation rather than confrontation is a more winning diplomatic strategy.

8. Dialogue in Perspective

National Dialogue is a noble principle and an overriding goal which no reasonable person can oppose. Differences can only arise on the details of implementation, in particular, the extent to which it respects inclusivity, integrity, and transparency.

If the National Dialogue is to achieve its stated objectives, then it must adhere to these principles or face certain failure. That would defeat its very purpose. It is therefore in the overriding national interest not only to support the National Dialogue, but to be actively involved in its implementation and strive to ensure its adherence to the stipulated principles.

While the urgent quest for peace makes it imperative that the National Dialogue produces results within the shortest possible period, the very concept of dialogue implies a process that continues as part of human interaction in all situations and at all levels.

In terms of the order of priority, while the cause of peace and unity is a comprehensive national aspiration, top on the priority list must be to end the armed conflict that is tearing the nation apart. Related to the conflict at the national level are regionally
based inter-communal conflicts that are also threatening national peace and security. Then there are conflicts at the grassroots level, which though internal to the community, are nonetheless destabilizing to many communities and ultimately to the nation.

Finally, a related issue on the agenda of the national dialogue must be restoring, strengthening and reforming our traditional governance systems to complement the state in maintaining peace and security at the grassroots, which is cumulatively pivotal to the maintenance of national peace and security. To restate by way of emphasis a point made in the President's Concept Note and various statements, National Dialogue is not an event, but a process that is on-going as a means of preventing, managing, and resolving conflicts that arise as an inherent aspect of normal human relations, but become heightened at moments of crises. It is my firm belief that crises often create opportunities, and while pessimism leads to a dead end, optimism, if not blind, generates constructive action. National Dialogue offers an optimistic opportunity to end bloodshed and ensure lasting peace, unity, security, stability and prosperity that our country so badly needs and rightly deserves. The following policy suggestions are presented.

- Engage the Leadership of the SPLM/A in a sincere review of the ideals and principles of the liberation struggle and why the independent South Sudan has failed to honor the fundamental values of the struggle;

- Identify the challenges and obstacles that now stand in the way of radically reforming the system to revive the ideals and principles of the liberation struggle and how they can be acted upon to inspire and guide corrective measures to improve future performance;

- Undertake an objective and credible review of the history of the support South Sudan received from the international community in its liberation struggle and in its post-independence development efforts, why the country has lost international goodwill, and what can be done to regain it and promote international partnership in addressing the challenges facing South Sudan; and

- Develop and sustain a culture of Dialogue as a strategy for preventing, managing, and resolving internal conflicts and for constructively engaging the international community in a mutually beneficial partnership to address the security and development challenges facing the country.

**About Sudd Institute**

*The Sudd Institute* is an independent research organization that conducts and facilitates policy relevant research and training to inform public policy and practice, to create opportunities for discussion and debate, and to improve analytical capacity in South Sudan. The Sudd Institute’s intention is to significantly improve the quality, impact, and accountability of local, national, and international policy- and decision-making in South Sudan in order to promote a more peaceful, just and prosperous society.

**Author’s Biography**
Francis M. Deng has recently been assigned the position of South Sudan's Roving Ambassador after having been the country's first Permanent Representative to the United Nations. Prior to that, he served for five years as the United Nations Secretary-General's Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide at the level of Under-Secretary-General. From 1992 to 2004, he served as Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons. His first position in the United Nations was that of Human Rights Officer in the Secretariat from 1967 to 1972 when he was appointed Sudan's Ambassador to the Nordic Countries. He was also Sudan's Ambassador to Canada and the United States of America and was also Minister of State for Foreign Affairs for five years. After leaving his Government's service, he held a series of positions in leading think tanks and universities in the United States. Dr. Deng graduated with an LLB (honors) from the University of Khartoum to which he was appointed member of the Law Faculty and then sent abroad for post-graduate studies. He holds an LLM and a JSD from Yale University Law School. Dr. Deng has authored and edited over thirty books in a wide variety of fields and has written two novels on the crisis of national identity in the Sudan.